LAST EVENT
Tuesday 30th September 2008
12.30 – 14.00
Hall 5 Birmingham International Conference Centre
This meeting was sponsored by  |
“Resurgent Threats:
Terror, Russia and Iran? ”
Speakers:
Dr. Liam Fox M.P.
Shadow Secretary of State for Defence
and
Dr. Jack Caravelli
Visiting Professor UK Defence Academy
At this fringe meeting each of our speakers outlined options. Please click on name link above.
Comments made by Dr. Liam Fox M.P.
Shadow Secretary of State for Defence:
Russia’s swift and strategic invasion of Georgia in mid-August highlighted the stark reality of energy geopolitics in Eurasia. Aside from the objectives of scuttling Georgia and Ukraine’s NATO membership hopes and demarcating a clear sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, Moscow intended to send the message to the broader West that it takes the competition over control of energy resources more seriously than any other player in the game.
Georgia is the needle’s eye through which Caspian oil and gas from Azerbaijan’s coast and Kazakhstan’s reserves reach Western markets.
With Russia to the north, Iran to the south and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict ruling out Armenia as a passageway, the East-West Energy and Transport Corridor connecting Europe and Asia cannot but run through Georgian territory. It was thus not surprising that when Russian forces broke out of Georgia’s separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, their primary targets were energy-related. In surrounding and finally occupying Gori, they menaced the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and its sister gas route: the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP). By occupying the Black Sea port of Poti and its hinterlands, they blocked both the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline and the rail-link bringing Kazakhstani oil supplies to the coast. The Russian Black Sea Fleet’s blockade of Georgia’s coastline also prevented any tankers from pursuing their usual routes. Needless to say, all four routes were shut down due to precautionary measures.
A fortuitous attack by Kurdish rebels on the BTC in Turkey three days before the spark of conflict meant that Russia’s invasion came at a time when the pipeline’s oil had been rerouted through Baku-Supsa, and a small pipeline from Azerbaijan to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. Together with the halting of railway and tanker transport through and from Georgia, Russia effectively took control of all Caspian energy reserves headed for Western markets. The U.S. Department of Defense confirmed Georgian reports that Russian bombers targeted the BTC and SCP pipelines, but were unsuccessful in inflicting damage to infrastructure. A train carrying Azerbaijani oil to Georgia’s port of Batumi, however, was derailed near Gori, reportedly by a Russian mine, after Russian troops had begun withdrawing from the area. While exports through the BTC and SCP have resumed, Moscow’s message was unmistakable. Not only is Russia’s leadership willing to use violence to block or destroy Western-oriented energy routes, but with reinforced positions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it will have the wherewithal to do so within hours. The geopolitical consequences are already apparent: in the midst of crisis in Georgia, Azerbaijan signed an oil swap deal for export through Iran.
However dramatic, Georgia’s predicament is just one piece of a much larger struggle for energy resources and geopolitical leverage on Europe’s periphery. European dependence on Russian energy, particularly natural gas, has led to geopolitical consequences such as the development of alternative routes to the Caspian through the Black Sea region, a reluctance to jeopardize relations with Moscow at almost any cost and hesitation among some European governments to isolate energy-rich Iran. Nevertheless, at the moment this dependence does not cripple the entire Trans-Atlantic framework. A natural gas cartel, plans for which have been floated by Russia and other gas-rich nations, however, could have global implications, not only for the price of gas, but for options for Western access to the resource. The development of a ‘gas OPEC’, coupled with the threat of force may present a significant challenge to Trans-Atlantic unity.
With all the talk about Georgia and the focus on Iraq and Afghanistan there is another region where Russia intends to increasingly control and influence that is too often overlooked—the resource rich Arctic.
Last summer, Russia announced its intention to annex a 460,000 square mile portion of ice-covered Arctic. Scientists claim that that area, on which Russia has audaciously set its sights, may contain 10 billion tonnes of gas and oil deposits. While that ridiculous claim has no legitimate legal basis, the west must take such threats from Russia seriously.
With ice melting in the Arctic, and shipping passages and possible mineral exploitation becoming an increasing possibility, we may be witnessing a scramble for the resource-rich Arctic.
The reality is that Arctic sovereignty and the potential exploitation of energy resources are issues we will have to face at some point. Four of the five Arctic powers—Norway, Canada, the United States, and Denmark—are not only members of NATO but are some of the alliances most active participants in NATO led military operations. Inevitably, what impacts them will eventually impact us.
It has been argued by some that as the EU and NATO push eastward and towards the Caspian region, Russia is looking towards the north. A scramble for Arctic resources will bring a new dynamic to international security and how we address threats.
In the UK, with our focus on Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans, it would be easy to ignore. The complexity of the Arctic question makes it too easy to look the other way and hope that someone else deals with the problem. But are we as a nation, or NATO as our collective security alliance, ready to deal with any threat that may emerge over the Arctic?
On a recent trip to Ottawa, I found that the issue of Arctic security is taken very seriously— it is a main focus in Canadian security discourse.
Canada will open a new army training centre for cold-weather fighting at Resolute bay, and a deepwater port on the northern tip of Baffin Island. Canada is also beefing up its military presence in the far north by adding 900 Rangers to the 4,000 already there. Last July, Prime Minister Harper announced that six to eight new navy patrol ships would be built to guard the Northwest Passage sea route in the Arctic.
If military might and nuclear weapons formed the core of Soviet power during the Cold War, Russian elites view its energy resources as the basis of its power now. Consequently, Russia will continue to seek new energy resources at any cost—just as I just mentioned regarding Caspian Region.
Russia’s petrodollars are financing a $209 billion overhaul of its armed forces between now and 2015 that will essentially lead to the replacement of around 45 per cent of Russia’s military hardware. The great irony is that western addiction to oil and gas is funding Russia’s military build-up.
I’m not seeking the militarisation of the Arctic, nor am I calling for an increase in Royal Navy icebreakers or Arctic warfare training. The way is it now, the British Armed Forces are overstretched and undermanned in Iraq and Afghanistan, we must focus on the current tasks at hand with the limited resources that are available.
But failing to recognise the importance of an issue that is so dear to our closest allies is both naive and irresponsible. Yes, the security dilemma posed by the question of Arctic sovereignty is only a small part of global security but it is a part that shouldn’t be ignored. With the shared importation of risk in our globalised world we must be prepared for everything.
The West cannot afford to focus on Russian involvement in Central Asia and the Caspian at the expense neglecting the Arctic. This will be a challenge but one that is very necessary.
Outline of remarks by Dr. Jack Caravelli:
- Iran has pursued through multiple mechanisms—including clandestine and illicit technology transfers—to develop a nuclear weapons capability and on a parallel track a long-range missile programme to deliver nuclear weapons to distant targets. It has the current capability to hit targets throughout the Middle East.
- Iran has received assistance in its nuclear and missiles programme development from Russian, Pakistani and North Korean entities and individuals. In each case the assistance has roots dating to the 1990s.
- Iran’s commitment of domestic resources to these programmes has been extensive and long-standing. Within the next year the Bushehr nuclear power plant is likely to become operational. The power plant is fully legal within the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of which Iran is a member. However, the concern is that Iran will divert and reprocess the plutonium waste product to produce fissile material needed to make a nuclear device.
- Iran’s radical Revolutionary Guards organization oversees these programmes and probably profits financially from the resources being expended by the government on them. The Revolutionary Guards are supported by Iranian President Ahmadinejad, who has spoken of wiping Israel “off the map.”
- According to a September 2008 report issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran has improved significantly the efficiency of the centrifuges operating at Natanz. Centrifuges are required to enrich uranium, the other path to acquiring fissile material. The IAEA estimate is that Iran could master the process of enriching uranium within the next 6-18 months in a way that would produce perhaps sufficient quantities of fissile material for several nuclear devices.
- The international community since at least the mid-1990s has endeavored to slow or stop Iran’s WMD programmes. The US imposed unilateral financial sanctions on Iran during the Clinton administration and attempted via bilateral negotiations with Russia to end the assistance being provided by some Russian experts to Iran.
- In addition, the EU-3, Britain, France and Germany and the IAEA have engaged in protracted talks with Tehran. The UN Security Council has passed resolutions in 2006, 2007 and 2008 imposing financial sanctions on Iranian entities and organizations believed to be involved in Iran’s WMD work. None of these efforts has altered Iran’s programmatic activities.
- The next US administration should strongly consider restoring diplomatic relations with Iran as a means to better understanding how the Iranian political process is operating—there are many factions at work and national elections will be held in June 2009—and to learn if there are any prospects for resolving this problem short of the use of force. The military option should remain on “on the table.”
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